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Preface by David Boys, PSI  
 
Africa needs electricity: it does not need privatisation. This report sets the record straight on the failures of 
privatisation in Africa. Instead it advocates policies based on proven successes.  
 
The success of extending electricity systems across the north, and much of the south, using public sector 
electricity companies.  
 
The success of using public finance to invest in systems, so that the living conditions of people and the needs 
of industry can be met fast enough to accelerate development. 
 
The success of using subsidies and cross-subsidies to ensure that the poor can afford to use electricity once 
they are connected to it. 
 
The success of insisting on transparency, public participation and debate, and accountability to ensure that 
electricity is developed in the public interest, not as another way of enriching large corporations and 
powerful individuals in the north and south. 
 
PSI is working with its affiliated unions all over the world to develop better electricity systems and better 
public policies. PSI trade unions in Africa are working with other civil society organisations, including 
consumer groups and environmentalists, to develop effective policies that work in the public interest. This 
includes developing ways of dealing with corruption at all levels – including the multinational companies 
and top government officials and politicians. 
 
PSI is pursuing demands for these policies in global forums – at the meetings of UN organisations, and at 
global energy conferences, and in dialogue with the international banks and financial institutions.  
 
The most important element in this activity is the organised strength of the unions together with the 
organised strength of civil society. That is why the World Social Forum at Nairobi in January 2007 is such 
an important event. 
 
 
David Boys 
 
Utilities and Pensions Officer   
Public Services International  
 e-mail: david.boys@world-psi.org 
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1. Executive summary  
In Africa as elsewhere there are three key issues with electricity systems. 
 The need for sufficient  power generating capacity (and an efficient transmission system to use it) 
 Extension of systems to all households and businesses 
 Efficiency and reliability of the system 
 
In Africa as elsewhere, the private sector has been promoted as the solution to all these problems, but the 
empirical evidence shows that the private sector does not deliver these benefits.  
 The state has to protect private investors against risks with guarantees which increase the burden on 
public finance 
 Private power stations are very vulnerable to corrupt deals which make the state liable for  long-term 
power which is unaffordable to consumers 
 Private distributors do not invest private capital in extensions to the poor 
 Private companies are no more efficient than public operators 
 Attempts to create competitive „liberalised‟ markets in electricity have not worked eg USA, EU 
 
In Africa as elsewhere, development through the public sector is a viable and proven way forward 
 The government pays lower interest rates and so the cost of capital is lower – even in Africa 
 Development of affordable electricity and other services has been done in almost all countries 
through the public sector, financed through subsidy and cross-subsidy 
 The public sector is in principle more accountable and responsive to public interest 
 
In Africa as elsewhere policies to develop the electricity sector need to be based on 
 Open public debate to set democratic public objectives 
 Electricity needs to be treated as a developmental public service 
 An effective public sector authority is the key instrument for this 
 Investment needs to be accelerated by using public finance including state and utility borrowing 
 Subsidy must be built in to finance extensions and make electricity affordable 
 New transparent governance need to be developed for the public sector 
 
2. The need for electricity in sub-Saharan Africa 
Africa needs more generating capacity. It needs for affordable electricity. Above all, it needs more 
extensions of the system. 
 
The percentage of households connected to electricity supply in sub-Saharan Africa is lower than in any 
other region of the world.  The gap between rural and urban electrification is larger than in other regions. 
And the poorest sections of the population are far less connected than the highest income groups.  The 
numbers connected to electricity in Africa are growing, but more slowly than in other countries of similar 
income levels. Average electricity consumption per capita in sub-Saharan Africa is about 456 kWh – 
about two and half times less than the per capita consumption in Latin America and Caribbean 
region (1,493 kwh).1 
Table 1.  Proportion of African households connected to electricity supply 
Total  14.9% 
   
By rural/urban   
 Rural 8.3% 
 Urban 54.0% 
   
By income   
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 Poorest 20% 0% 
 Next poorest 20% 4% 
 Middle 20% 12% 
 Next richest 20% 28% 
 Richest 20% 71% 
Source: Estache 2006A. 
 
 
Electricity policies, including privatisation, have to be judged against this overriding objective: what can 
they contribute to extending electricity to the poor of Africa? 
 
3. The record of electricity privatisation in Africa and elsewhere 
Electricity privatisation has been heavily promoted by the World Bank and other donors since the 1990s.  
Companies are encouraged to invest in power stations and so increase generating capacity. Private 
companies take over ownership or management of networks and are expected to make the investments 
necessary to extend the system, and improve its efficiency and reliability. And power pools are created, 
linking systems together so that different power stations can „compete‟ to sell their outputs.  
 
The private sector has been introduced in a number of ways. In some cases, the existing vertically integrated 
monopolies were sold to the private sector in Cape Verde and Senegal; in six countries the integrated 
systems were handed over as long term concessions, in some cases in combination with the water system: 
Cameroon, Comoros, Côte d‟Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali. Most privatisation has 
been by the privatisation of power stations, either through the sale of existing facilities, or through the 
creation of new Independent Power Producers (IPPs), with their finance guaranteed through long-term 
power purchase agreements (PPAs).2  
 
It is now recognised by most observers – including the World Bank – that private sector investment energy 
has not delivered significant investment, and many multinational companies have withdrawn, due to losses 
and uncertainty.3  There have been problems of corruption, overpricing and inefficiency in both generation 
and distribution.  
 
This part of the paper includes two sections on the experience with privatisation in Africa with examples 
from Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda 4: 
 problems in private generation  
 problems in private distribution 
 
Five further sections discuss the general evidence on the impact of privatisation 
 lack of evidence for the efficiency of the private sector 
 impact on investment 
 impact on prices 
 impact on labour 
 impact on economy 
 
 
3.1. Private generation (IPPs) in Africa: corruption and overcharging 
The experience with private power stations (IPPs) shows repeated evidence of corruption and overcharging 
by multinational companies. 
 
3.1.1. Kenya  
There have been three main IPPs in Kenya: Tsavo Power (owned by a consortium including the UK-owned 
Globeleq, the USA company CMS, and the World Bank);  Iberafrica (80% owned by Spanish multinational 
Union Fenosa); and Westmont Power (owned by a Malaysian company). 
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An audit report in 2004 on the state-owned distributor Kenya Power and Light Company (KPLC) exposed 
improper dealings, inflated prices and profiteering by the IPPs, which had caused great financial problems 
for KPLC.  5  The cost of electricity from the IPPs was far higher than the prices charged by the parastatal 
generating company, Kengen. 6 The contracts of both Iberafrica and Westmont were improperly awarded in 
breach of tendering procedures, Westmont‟s PPA was backdated to start 13 days before it was signed, KPLC 
agreed to buy expensive fuel for Westmont and then re-purchase it at „exorbitant prices‟, and Iberafrica‟s 
contract stipulated that the company should be paid in US dollars. 7  
 
The IPPs: “raked in Ksh18.4 billion ($235 million) as profits since they began their operations in 1997…. 
The committee has written to the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority to investigate weekly withdrawals at 
Iberafrica banker, Banque Indosuez, by a bodyguard of a former top official.  …. Iberafrica has several 
hidden costs which are catered for by a flawed power purchase agreement.  …. KPLC engaged the 
overpricing IPP, Iberafrica, in 1997 without any advertising for tendering. …. the speed of the transaction 
indicated that the former managing director had some vested interests in these particular firms and the board 
may have been used only to rubber stamp the decision". 8  
 
Westmont Power, which operated a barge power station at Mombasa, was accused in 2003 of paying bribes 
to Samuel Gichuru, former chairman of the Kenya Power and Lighting Company. It was ordered to cut its 
tariffs in half, and left Kenya when its contract expired in 2004.  
In 2004 the government decided to „phase out‟ IPPs because of the inflated prices: “The Government will 
begin a gradual phasing out of independent power producers this year…who have in the past been accused of 
selling power to the electricity distributor at higher prices compared to state-owned KenGen.” 9  
 
3.1.2. Tanzania 
There are currently two independent power producers (IPPs) in Tanzania. 
 
One is the 110MW Songas plant gas-fired plant, originally controlled by AES (60 per cent) but taken over by 
Globeleq in November 2002. In 2006 this experienced technical problems and failed to deliver power (see 
below under Globeleq).  
 
The other IPP is a US$150m, 100MW diesel-fired independent power plant located at Tegeta in Dar-es-
Salaam, owned by Independent Power Tanzania Ltd (IPTL), which is majority-owned by the Malaysian 
company Mechmar. The plant has been very profitable for Mechmar, accounting for over half of the 
Malaysian company‟s total sales in 2002. It sells its output under a 20-year power purchase agreement signed 
with Tanesco in 1995, which was soon exposed as too costly: 
“The deal provoked controversy as soon as it was sealed, with donors and energy experts saying that 
it was too expensive, the choice of technology doubtful and the projected demand for power 
exaggerated. Tanesco was forced to pay a steep price for electricity it did not require, since its major 
problem was not insufficient generating capacity but lack of gridlines. IPTL's electricity is said to 
cost 12 US cents per unit compared with the 7 US cents and 9 US cents per unit for power supplied 
by Tanesco. Additionally, Tanesco pays $3 million a month in statutory costs.” 10 
Tanesco brought a successful court case against IPTL to compel it to reduce the cost of building the power 
plant by $27 million from $150 million.11  
 
In 2006 the government was in discussions to nationalise IPTC, which would result in significant savings by 
reducing the cost of power: 12 
“If the deal is successful, the government will save as much as $1.5 million per month. The Tanzania 
Electric Supply Company (Tanesco) currently pays Songas and IPTL a total of $18 million from the 
$21 million it collects every month.” 
 
3.1.3. Uganda 
The government commissioned a 50-megawatt thermal power plant at Mutundwe in Kampala from a 
Norwegian company, Jacobsen AS, but in July 2006 the Inspector General of Government, Justice Faith 
Mwondha, cancelled the contract for impropriety and recommended the sacking of Engineer Dr Frank 
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Sebbowa, the Chief Executive Officer of the Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA) together with the 
regulator's Legal Counsel Mr J. Kwesigabo in relation to the deal because it was full of irregularities and 
illegalities: “the procurement of the 50MW, meant to relieve the country of its biting power shortage, had 
been conducted in a manner that disregarded the law and set down procedures "13 
 
The deal also involved illicit obtaining of a grant from Norway and a bank loan which the government of 
Uganda would have been liable to repay:  “….ERA, Jacobsen, and Energy officials had "engaged in 
soliciting for a grant of Euros3.4 million on behalf of the government of Uganda" without the explicit 
approval of the Minister of Finance and later tried to cover it up….. the government would [also] have been 
saddled with a loan of Euros 49.63 million from the Standard Chartered Bank in London after Energy 
officials failed to act against the company for altering the terms under which it submitted its bid. She said she 
was told all that was needed was for the Ministry of Finance to accept the debt in writing.” 
 
The majority of the generating capacity in Uganda , including the Nalubaale hydro-electric plant (177MW), 
is owned by UEGCL, formerly part of the old parastatal company. In 2002 a concession to operate UEGCL 
for 20 years was given to the South African company Eskom won. It was the only bidder. 
 
A number of temporary power plants have been installed and are operated by Aggreko, including a 50MW 
thermal plant at Lugogo, a 100MW thermal plant at Kiira power station in Jinja, and another 50MW thermal 
plant at Mutundwe. Aggreko has also been given a contract for a 40MW temporary gas-fired power station 
in Tanzania. 14 These do not contribute to a long-term sustainable solution, and are very costly, but very 
profitable to the companies. In 2006 Aggreko‟s sales grew by 40%, and its profits grew by 20.15 
A variety of other schemes are being promoted by the government or the World Bank. 
The Bujagali hydro-electric plant (250MW) has been promoted by the World Bank for many years, despite 
strong opposition on environmental grounds and repeated allegations of corruption. It was to have been built 
by a consortium led by the US company, AES, but AES abandoned the project in 2003. In 2005, the 
government contracted with a new firm to build the project, the Aga Khan's IPS Ltd. based in Nairobi. In 
2006, the project was being considered for financing from the World Bank and EIB; decisions are expected 
in the first quarter of 2007.  
 
The Ugandan government is also handing over some of its limited taxation income as a handout to the 
private companies. The government has waived import duty, excise duty and withholding tax on most 
equipment used in the electricity sector, a policy announced in a paper on 'Meeting the needs of the energy 
sector investor through conducive tax policy,' at a workshop organised by the Energy Institute of Uganda in 
July 2006. 16   
 
3.1.4. Nigeria 
In 1999 Enron agreed to develop an IPP in Lagos, involving supplying 290MW from nine barge-mounted 
gas turbines at Egbin Power Station, to provide electricity for industrial consumers in the state. The deal was 
based on a 13 year power purchase agreement (PPA) which specified that NEPA would buy power at 
USD$0.032/kWh.  This deal formed part of the prosecutions against former Enron executives, who had 
misrepresented the status of the barges. 17 
 
In January 2001 Enron sold the project to another USA company, AES. A Nigerian partner, YF Power, a 
division of Nigeria's privately held Yinka Folawiyo Group, was given an unknown stake in the project.18  
The National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) had to continue paying in accordance with the PPA contract, 
which caused massive losses for NEPA. In 2003 NEPA.demanded that Lagos State should renegotiate the 
contract due to the financial burden imposed by the contract terms, particularly since the state government 
was failing to pay its 15% share of the guaranteed price. A NEPA director, Sam Agbogun, said that the 
contract term is one sided in favour of AES because "we [NEPA] were not involved in the negotiations, 
otherwise we would have straightened out all the grey areas in the contracts. …..we have had to abide by the 
contract terms because the integrity of the country is involved and any attempt to do otherwise would send 
wrong signals to some foreign investors ….. What we are trying to do now is to call all the parties and lay 
the cards on the table, because the contract terms are now threatening our survival". 19  The integrity of the 
IPP deal was further questioned in 2005 by National Union of Electricity Employees (NUEE) 
representatives, who implied that AES was exaggerating the amount of electricity it was actually supplying 
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to NEPA: "How do we know the quantity of energy delivered to us by the IPP, that is, AES and AGIP? 
Where is the meter measuring the consumption of the zone from the IPP, and who reads the meter to know 
the actual energy delivered to the zone from IPP every month?" 20  In 2006, the Peoples Democratic Party 
(PDP) called for on the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to probe the Lagos/AES power 
project claiming that it has cost the state over $500 million.21 
3.2. Distribution in Africa: problems with management contracts 
Electricity distribution companies have been privatised in a few places around the world, usually with poor 
results. In Africa, the main forms of privatisation have been not by sale but by management contracts. These 
are simply contracts to manage and run the company, usually for a period of 2-5 years, but do not involve 
any investment by the private company.  In one case, Uganda, there is a concession contract, lasting for 20 
years, under which the private company collects the income from customers but is expected to make 
investments in the system before taking the rest as profit.  
 
3.2.1. Management services contracts 
Management services contracts have been introduced in electricity distribution in a number of African 
countries.  They have a poor record: in 6 countries (excluding Kenya where the contract is just starting) there 
have been two terminations, one disputed attempt to terminate, and significant problems in the other cases.  
The cases include: 
 In Tanzania, the World Bank insisted, as a condition for granting a loan, that Tanesco should be 
run under a management services contract, which was awarded in 2002 Net Group Solutions 
of South African, a private consultancy. In September 2004, under pressure from the World 
Bank, the contract was extended for a further two years, despite criticism of the high salaries 
paid to Net Group managers. In 2006 the Tanzanian government decided not to renew the 
contract because of poor performance: “Tanzania was dissatisfied with the quality of 
management provided by Net Group Solutions and added that the government was obliged 
to listen to the views of the public following complaints about the quality of service being 
offered by Tanesco.” 22  
 In Namibia in 2001, the town of Keetsmanshoop awarded a “lucrative” 23 15-year management 
contract to SelCo, a South African owned company listed on the Johannesburg stock exchange. The 
contract has been controversial and there is strong local opposition, criticism of poor performance 
and a High Court case over the legality of the lengthy contract. In November 2005 the municipality 
said it was terminating the contract, but this was overturned by a court ruling (which increased the 
company‟s share price by 300%). 24 The municipality argues that “SelCo conned the previous Town 
Council into the power supply deal with a lucrative royalty offer of N$160 000…. the town had 
received between N$80 000 and N$90 000 in royalties.” 25 In July 2006 SelCo was publicly: 
“accused of 'exporting' two electricity transformers to Mozambique: SelCo reportedly uses the 
equipment on one of the projects it secured with the government in Mozambique.” 26 
 Madagascar contracted the management of its electrical utility to German infrastructure firm 
Lahmeyer International in February 2005, under pressure from the World Bank, which demanded 
staff cuts. 27  The company increased tariffs by 30% in July and 35% in November 2006, and another 
10% increase was expected in 2007: in December 2005 however the new chief executive was sacked 
“not sufficiently specialised to lead Jirama out of its deep financial water into recovery”.28 
 
Outside Africa, Azerbaijan issued two separate management contracts for its distribution grids. Barmek, a 
Turkish-owned company was given a 25-year contract to manage the distribution grids of Baku and 
Sumqayit; Bayva was given a similar contract for the other distribution grids. In December 2005 the Bayva 
contract was ended, with the government claiming that Bayva had failed to deliver. In March 2006 the Azeri 
government started criminal proceedings against Barmek for “a failure to fulfil its contractual obligations, 
misappropriation state funds and involvement in financial frauds”, and terminated the contract. 29 
 
Other countries have considered these contracts but not introduced them. Senegal, after two failed attempts at 
privatizing its electricity by sale, also failed in an attempt to set up a management services contract for its 
electricity system: “a management contract was offered to Vivendi, but the French company's demands were 
considered too stringent and the offer was withdrawn.”30  The state of Karnataka, in southern India, has 
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considered using management contracts because there was no prospect of the state receiving good bids for 
the distribution companies; however there was even less interest in the management contracts, and in 
November 2006 neither privatization nor service contracts had been introduced. 31 The government of 
Ecuador was also discussing, in 2006, the possibility of management contracts for the country‟s electricity 
distribution services, as an alternative to privatization by sale. 32 
 
Table 2.  Management service contracts for electricity distribution 
Country Electricity 
distributor 
Date Yrs Terminated Private 
company 
Country  of 
private group  
Results 
Albania KESH 2000   Enel Italy Problems: price rises, 
disconnections 
Namibia Keetmanshoop 2001 15  SelCo South Africa Disputed termination: alleged 
theft, invalid contract 
Azerbaijan Baku and others 2002 25 2006 Barmek, 
Bayva 
Turkey,  Terminated: fraud, non-
performance 
Tanzania Tanesco 2002  2006 Net Group South Africa Terminated: non-performance 
Madagascar Jirama 2005 2  Lahmeyer Germany Problems:  CEO sacked 
Kenya KPLC 2006   Manitoba 
Hydro 
Canada  
Source: PSIRU database 
 
 
3.2.2. World Bank experiment in Uganda 
Uganda‟s distribution company, UEDCL, was privatised in May 2004 under a 20 year concession contract to 
a consortium known as 'Umeme' which is 56 per cent owned by CDC Globeleq (a financial investment arm 
of the UK government) and 44 per cent owned by Eskom (the publicly owned integrated South African 
electric utility).  The assets remain owned by UEDCL, but Umeme has a 20 year concession, under which it 
is responsible for investment, charges and management of the distribution system.  
In 2005 Umeme increased prices by 24%, and again in 2006 by a further 37% .33 An unsuccessful court case 
was brought on behalf of all Ugandans belonging to the Uganda Electricity Users Association (UEUA), 
claiming that the procedures used did not involve consumers and were not transparent as they are required to 
be under Ugandan law.34 
The contract allowed its international shareholders to opt out after 18 months in June 2006, and by then 
Umeme was making a loss: Globeleq denied it was pulling out 35, but unfortunately Eskom at the same time 
was reported as saying that it would pull out of all its investments in Africa outside South Africa.  The 18-
month „trial period‟ was extended to December 2006, so Globeleq and Eskom could still decide to leave 
without suffering any penalty.36 To improve profitability, Umeme demanded further price rises.37 
 
Umeme has used other techniques to boost its profits. It started to dispute the size of the lease payment it 
makes for use of the Ugandan network, and delayed payment of the $24.3m due for the first 18-months until 
October 2006. 38 It has also been demanding a tax break, claiming it should benefit from half of the tax 
allowances of  the state holding company UEDCL, which means a windfall to Umeme of  $6m.39  
 
In the first 18 months Eskom and Globeleq invested only $5m in the system. In September 2006 they 
promised to invest a further $100m., using loans rather than the shareholders‟ equity capital of Eskom and 
Globeleq. Much of these loans will in reality be money from donors, rather than Eskom or Globeleq. Umeme 
has already benefited from: “an $11 million loan from the World Bank affiliate International Development 
Agency to buy materials, which are now being turned over to Umeme. …These materials were all supposed 
to be installed in the initial 18-months period, but were not. 40 
 
3.3. No efficiency advantage of the private sector 
There is a widespread belief that the private sector is always more efficient than the public sector, in 
electricity as in other sectors.  
 
This belief is not supported by empirical evidence, either in Africa or elsewhere. 
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A global review of this evidence in 2005 by the World Bank concluded:  
 
“For utilities, it seems that in general ownership often does not matter as much as sometimes argued. 
Most cross-country papers on utilities find no statistically significant difference in efficiency scores 
between public and private providers. As for the country specific papers, some do find differences in 
performance over time but these differences tend to matter much less than a number of other 
variables.” 41  
 
The evidence includes a global study in 1995 by Pollitt, which compared dozens of public and private 
electricity operators all over the world, and found no significant systematic difference between public and 
private in terms of efficiency.42  A study in Cote d‟Ivoire, after private management electricity was 
introduced in the 1990s, was similarly ambivalent: “efficiency improved but irregularly and was never as 
efficient as when under public management and tight budget constraint.” 43  Some studies found that the 
public sector was much more efficient: an early study in the USA in the 1970s found that private electricity 
companies had consistently higher costs, and that private firms charge higher prices. 44   
 
It is also widely believed that utilities in developing countries, whether public or private, are far less efficient 
than in rich regions like North America and Europe. More surprisingly, the empirical studies by economists  
do not support this assumption. The global study of electricity companies by Pollitt in 1995 found that in 
terms of efficiency “there were no significant differences for LDCs from the average of other countries in the 
early part of the 1990s”; other studies of electricity companies confirmed this, finding that  “efficiency levels 
in developing countries were very roughly equivalent to those in Australia and Japan, the United States, 
lower than in Europe, but much higher than in Canada”. 45   
 
Privatisation does not eliminate technical failures either. Blackouts have been common following 
privatisations – two of the largest cities in south America, Buenos Aires in Argentina and Rio de Janeiro in 
Brazil, suffered blackouts lasting for many days following privatisation.46 Liberalisation may also worsen the 
risk of blackouts: both Europe and North America have experienced major blackouts following liberalisation 
of energy markets, associated with transmission systems being unable to cope with complex volumes of 
power trading. 47  An official report on the total blackout in Italy in 2003 identified a simple conflict: “The 
underlying causes of the incident that occurred on 28 September 2003 are the unresolved conflict between 
the trading interests of the involved countries and operators and the technical and legal requirements for safe 
and reliable operation of the networks.” 48 
 
The use of private sector operators also exposes electricity systems to further risks which do not exist under 
public sector operators. The first of these is the risk of corporate exits: unlike state-owned companies, private 
companies may decide to abandon a contract because it becomes unprofitable, for example when Globeleq 
abandoned the Kelvin power station in South Africa, or when AES abandoned a distribution system in 
Orissa, India.  The second is the danger of monopoly or cartels, a risk vividly demonstrated in California in 
2000 when Enron and other private companies colluded to force up electricity prices to unaffordable levels 
in the richest part of the world.  
 
3.4. Investment 
It is highly unlikely that the private sector will invest significant amounts of money in electricity in Africa, or 
indeed infrastructure in developing countries in general.  So far, only 10% of Africa‟s investment needs for 
infrastructure have been financed by the private sector, and neither private sector participation nor regulation 
makes any significant contribution to the extension of access to network services 49: ““The emphasis on 
profitability appears to have relegated expanded electrification of the poor to the bottom of the priority 
list.” 50 
 
The private sector will not invest unless they can make sufficient profit to cover all the risks. But they have 
been unable to do this: “Even apparently risk-free investments in generation have proved economically 
disastrous when it became clear that the companies involved had not understood the risks they were actually 
taking.  Currency risk, demand risk (demand can go down as well as up), and political risk (a government 
cannot stand by and allow electricity consumers to be priced out of the market) have all derailed apparently 
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safe investments and power purchase contracts have turned out to be not worth the paper they were written 
on when the buyer went bankrupt.” 51   
 
The brutal arithmetic of the multinationals‟ failure to find profitable investment opportunities is shown in a 
review of their rates of return. The graph shows, for a number of sectors, including electricity, the rate of 
return required by multinational corporations (return on equity – RoE), adjusted for the risks of investing in 
developing countries. For energy, as for other sectors, the rates of return actually achieved have fallen far 
short of the requirements of shareholders.   
Chart A. Multinational utilities fail to make big enough profits in developing countries 
 
Source: Estache at al 2004 52 
 
The investment failure of the private sector has been made worse by donors and IFIs who have cut back on 
funding in general and focussed their support on the private projects. This obsession with the private sector 
distorts aid by giving preference to projects that may be profitable for companies: “The large scale suppliers 
have tended to get a large share of the attention of the international community and of the donors even if they 
cater to only a small share of the population and most typically the rich.” 53 
3.5. Prices 
Electricity privatization does not normally lead to price reductions, partly because one of the main objectives 
is to increase the amount paid by consumers in order to reduce subsidies – from the government‟s viewpoint 
– and in order to maximise profits – from the private company‟s viewpoint.   
 
Cross-subsidies have been reduced, and price increases are used as a way of restoring the financial health of 
electricity companies: “power sector reform is typically associated with price increases aimed at making 
the utility more financially sound. In order to attract private investors, most reform programs have 
included measures to increase tariffs to cost reflective and commercially profitable levels”. 54 Even 
institutions advocating privatization now agree that: “the message is that privatisation will not lead to lower 
prices.” 55 
 
As a result, electricity has become more expensive for the poor – in Africa, the poor are paying about 7.5% 
of their income on energy. 56 A World Bank paper says that “this suggests that tariff structures may not have 
paid enough attention to the ability to pay of the users” 57, but these pricing policies are central to 
privatisation and commercialisation: each user is expected to pay the full cost of their own electricity, and so 
the poor household using little electricity has to pay much more than the industrial company.  
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A recent example of the effect of giving market pricing a higher priority than cross-subsidies for the poor can 
be seen in South Africa. Government policy allows for cross-subsidy, but also calls for the impact on 
industry to be minimised: in  Nelson Mandela Metropole (formerly Port Elizabeth), cross-subsidies to help 
poor consumers through cross-subsidisation from industry were ruled out because of the impact on 
companies. Instead, a new industrial development has involved companies being guaranteed electricity for 
25 years at a price far below the prices charged to households:58 
3.6. Labour 
Electricity privatisation has usually had the effect of cutting large numbers of jobs and fragmenting the 
workforce amongst a number of different private owners.  Jobs were cut by up to 66% by electricity 
privatisations in Latin America in the 1990s 59: in Argentina alone 78,000 jobs were lost in just three years 60; 
and the private companies casualised workers and reduced their conditions by terminating their employment 
and rehiring them through short-term outsourcing contracts. 61 
 
This damages the ability of countries to develop and sustain their own skills and resources: “developing 
countries have seen national companies that were a centre for skills and good employment practices 
destroyed at the command of the IFIs.” 62 
 
3.7. Economic impact 
The economic impact of privatisation of electricity companies is also negative.  The money paid by 
multinationals for the companies helps the state budget in the short term, but even this is usually a poor deal, 
because assets built up by public investment are usually sold below their true value. In any case the payments 
do not add to the investment in the system. Future profits are lost to the system and to the country, and so the 
overall effect is a net loss of  capital. This is made worse because the privatised companies are invariably 
able to exploit a monopolistic position, and so users of electricity suffer.  
 
An assessment of the Latin American privatisations concluded that they actually helped create economic 
crises: “In the end, while countries surrendered part of their domestic capital stock, the benefit for the 
balance of payments was only temporary. Thus, even if the reforms resulted in more efficient running of the 
power industry compared to the pre-privatisation period, they are likely to have contributed to the severe 
financial and economic crises which hit Brazil and (more catastrophically) Argentina in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s.” 63 
 
Selective privatisation may be just as problematic, because of the problem of „cherry-picking‟. Private 
companies bid for the most profitable operations, and so “a profit center is amputated from a public sector 
business at a higher net fiscal cost. There is significant evidence of this in Latin America.” 64 
 
3.8. Global summary 
Privatisation has become widely unpopular, is seen as benefiting elite and corrupt  interests at home and 
abroad, and as “fundamentally unfair, both in conception and execution.” Many private power stations 
(IPPs) have become expensive debt-like burdens because they are underpinned by government guarantees, 
which mean that the state has to pay for expensive electricity it does not need. Privatised distributors have 
created unsustainable price increases.  
 
In many countries, liberalisation or privatisation has failed to deliver expected improvements for a number of 
reasons. In the Philippines, misconceived assumptions about what would happen in a privatised system 
prevented the consideration of better alternative policies;65 in the Cameroon, IMF and World Bank 
conditions imposed a privatisation which resulted in the creation of a private, poorly regulated, vertically 
integrated monopoly, ignoring historical experience that development of electricity systems has always been 
state-led66; in Pakistan, policies were successful in attracting private investors in IPPs but at the cost of 
negative impacts on the economy and the environment. 
 
A wide-ranging review by an UNCTAD official concluded that “in a long-run development perspective, full-
scale privatisation of gas and power sectors in developing countries entails significant risks, and therefore a 
flexible policy approach is preferable to a rigid commitment to extensive liberalisation”.67 Other critiques of 
PSIRU University of Greenwich                                                                                                                        www.psiru.org 
18/05/201019/02/2008  Page 12 of 19  
  
the process have found that reforms focus on short-term financial issues, ignore social and environmental 
public interests, and may become locked in to an undesirable path that cannot be corrected.  Public sector 
models have serious problems but these can be addressed through greater public participation and 
transparency. 68 
 
4. Way forward: electrifying Africa 
The way forward for Africa does not lie with privatisation. Alternatives are being developed across the 
world,69 reflecting different circumstances, but there are certain core features for any alternative reform 
programme. These concern: 
 the need for public debate, public goals and political processes 
 treating electricity as a vital developmental sector and a vital public service 
 using an efficient and effective public sector operator as the key to development 
 using public finance to support investment 
 providing subsidies and cross-subsidies for extensions and affordability 
 ensuring that the public electricity operator is transparent and accountable 
 
4.1. Public goals, public decisions and political processes 
The first and most basic requirement is to base development of electricity on a transparent, participatory 
public debate. Many decisions concerning electricity system are taken in secret meetings, tied up with 
confidential negotiations with private companies and hidden pressures from donors and international 
institutions. A proper public debate can set public objectives and priorities, with democratic decisions 
forming a true national agenda for electricity. 
 
As part of the process, the electricity sector itself must be made more transparent, accountable to the public. 
Communities and unions need to work together to eliminate corruption at all levels of the system. Public 
sector operations have serious problems but these can be addressed through greater public participation and 
transparency : the work of groups such as Prayas in India can be used as a model in this repect.70 
 
A democratic debate also allows for political activity, so that organisations looking for greater social and 
environmental justice can work together to develop new plans for the sector. 
 
This outline is based on the concluding recommendations of a report by the World Resources Institute in 
2002, based on detailed studies of six countries– including Ghana and South Africa. 71 
 
Table 3.  WRI key recommendations for electricity policy 
1. Frame reforms around the goals to be achieved in the sector. 
2. Structure finance around reform goals, rather than reform goals around finance. 
3. Support reform processes with a system of sound governance. 
4. Build political strategies to support attention to a public benefits agenda. 
Source: Dubash 2002 (see bibliography) 
 
4.2. Electricity as a public service 
There are a number of features of electricity which make it necessary to treat it as a public service and 
manage the sector as a whole in the public interest. It is economically and socially necessary; must be 
continuously provided and balanced; is not suited to market competition; and has major environmental 
impacts.  
 
 Electricity supply has a vital role in modern economies and society. Businesses or public 
services cannot function without electricity, and household appliances also depend on it.  There 
is a social and economic need for universal affordable access, regardless of the user‟s immediate 
ability to pay the full cost of connection or supply, or of corporate requirements for profitability.  
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 There are special features of electricity which require the entire system to be managed as a 
whole and at all times. It is not possible for users to store power on any significant scale, and so 
there is a need for continuous  production; and electricity networks need supply and demand to 
match at all times, for technical reasons, and so there is a need for management of the system as 
a whole – generators and distributors cannot be allowed to switch on and off as they please.  
 
 The possibility of normal market competition is limited by three features. Electricity is a 
standard product, so there is no scope for competition to provide „better quality‟ electricity; there 
is no substitute for electricity in powering devices and machinery (although there are substitutes 
for heating); and electricity transmission and distribution networks are natural monopolies, so 
competing networks are never viable.  
 
 The process of electricity generation and transmission and distribution has major environmental 
impacts. Generation may consume natural resources of oil, gas or coal, pollute the environment 
by emissions. The construction of dams or generation facilities, and of transmission and 
distribution lines, causes major environmental damage, as well as damage to people‟s 
livelihoods. There is therefore a need for public policy to manage and minimise the impact on 
the environment. 72 
 
For all these reasons, electricity has to be treated as a public service, and run under a „public service system 
of production‟. 73 There is no significant role for „markets‟ in this type of system, least of all in sub-Saharan 
Africa: even private companies operate  under rules created by governments and international institutions, 
and are awarded contracts and licenses which are currently adjusted to meet the need of investors at the 
expense of consumers. Treating the system as a coherent public service managed by a public authority will 
deliver better results. 74 
 
4.3. Effectiveness of public sector 
The electricity systems of nearly all high income countries in the north were developed through the public 
sector, using municipal or state-owned vertically integrated systems, with subsidies used to finance 
expansion of the system to all households. 
 
This is supported by similar experience in Africa. A report by the World Bank‟s Energy Sector Management 
Assistance Programme (ESMAP) in 2005 on electrification in a sample of African countries found that 
extensions of electricity were not due to privatisation, but the major factor was active intervention by 
government based on equality-led policies, through public investment and subsidy: whereas full cost 
recovery resulting from privatisation can make electricity less affordable for the poor.75  
 
 South Africa‟s national electrification programme is the outstanding example of what is possible using 
public sector mechanisms. After the achievement of democracy in 1994, the government set a target to 
connect 2.5 million households to the electricity grid by 2000, through the public sector utility Eskom, 
financed by a cross-subsidy from electricity consumers. The percentage of the population with access to 
electricity rose from 40 percent in 1994 to 66 percent in 2002:  79 percent of the population in urban areas 
and 46 percent in rural areas had access to electricity. 76  By the end of 2006 over 3.3 million households had 
been connected, and the continuing programme is financed from a national government fund. 77  
 
Governments now need to set about building on their existing companies not breaking them up. 78 A number 
of countries in Africa and elsewhere have already revised and reversed previous plans for privatisation and 
liberalisation.  
 
- In 2006 Tanzania scrapped the plan to privatise its distributor Tanesco, and there will therefore be no 
privatisation for the foreseeable future.79 Tanzania is also in the process of nationalising an IPP and 
thereby saving $1.5m per year,  based on the realisation that publicly owned and financed power 
stations are much cheaper, because public finance is cheaper. 
 
- South Africa has abandoned its earlier plans for the privatisation of the electricity industry, and 
retained Eskom as an integrated parastatal electricity company responsible for generation, 
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transmission and distribution, and it is expected to retain its own in-house engineering and 
construction divisions. 80   
 
- Elsewhere, countries such as Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, and Thailand have reviewed their 
previous policies of liberalisation and privatisation.  
 
4.4. Public finance for investment 
The cost of capital to the public sector is almost invariably cheaper than for the private sector, even in Africa, 
as pointed out by a World Bank economist:  
 
“… it is only in Ethiopia, Mali and South Africa that public financing requires a higher rate of return than 
private financing for all sectors. ….. In most of the other countries, it is only for specific projects in any 
sector that it will be cost effective to rely on the private sector.” 81  But even specific private investment in 
IPPs are an expensive way for the government to borrow money. As Tanzania has worked out, in its plan to 
nationalise an IPP and save $1.5m per year, publicly owned and financed power stations are much cheaper, 
because public finance is cheaper. 
 
As acknowledged in a recent general paper by a World Bank economist: “….. the main responsibility for 
financing many of the investment needs will fall onto the taxpayers rather than the residential users .” 82   
A World Bank economist has recently accepted that the public sector role is crucial, and therefore that most 
attention has to be paid to building the capacity of public sector institutions:  
“Once it is accepted that the public sector will be the main actor and that donors will have to scale up 
their commitments, everyone needs to accept that the dramatic scale-up in aid risks overwhelming 
fragile institutions. The ideal would that the efficiency and effectiveness of use of greater aid flows 
will improve the delivery of public services and be coordinated with the development of good 
institutions that increase the accountability of all the parties involved.” 83 
 
The public sector needs to finance investment by issuing bonds, and even low-income African countries, 
including Kenya and Uganda, are now capable of doing that:   
 
“When stockbrokers from around Africa met in Nairobi in late 2004 to discuss developments in the capital 
markets, they urged governments on the continent to encourage infrastructure bonds. They argued that Africa 
could only make a leap forward by surmounting the hurdles of decayed roads, slow telecommunication, 
unsafe airports, poor ports and railways services, among other infrastructural inefficiencies. A case study was 
presented by the Uganda Securities Exchange, which was experimenting with the bonds. At the USE, the 
bond in question was intended to finance power generation to plug a generation shortfall.  The move to 
introduce infrastructure bonds in Kenya is likely to spur the next big move…. This logic is derived from the 
fact that the Central Bank of Kenya regularly advertises for Treasury bonds, which are often 
oversubscribed.” 84 
 
The big constraint on using public sector finance for investment has been the policies imposed by the 
international institutions, especially the IMF. These conditions have required cuts in public spending which 
has directly “led to under-maintenance and underinvestment across infrastructure sub sectors [and] damaged 
existing systems”. 85 These policies are not immutable: they have been put under pressure by South American 
governments, and in 2004 Brazil gained a concession from the IMF that  that public investment in profitable 
new assets should not be restricted: this allowed the Brazilian state electricity company, Eletrobras, to almost 
double its investment in electricity infrastructure. 86 
 
There remains a need for further external funding from development banks, “who have a duty now to show 
the same level of commitment in the form of loans, capacity building etc., in bringing the electricity 
industries back under public control as they did in encouraging privatisation.” 87 
4.5. Subsidy, cross-subsidy, and taxation 
Electricity must be affordable, which requires maintaining subsidies and cross-subsidies for the poor. This is 
now acknowledged even by a World Bank research paper: 
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“…. direct subsidies and cross-subsidies are not always as bad as they are made out to be. …. The 
evidence suggests that the poor can be deprived of infrastructure services in many ways. They often 
need to benefit from a connection subsidy as so often mentioned by casual analysts focusing on the 
access problem but they also often need to benefit from a subsidy for what amounts to be a minimum 
level of consumption. Unaffordable consumption, even with access is useless and vice versa”88 
 
South Africa again, is an example of government providing subsidies to enable poor households to receive 
50 KWh per month free, with reduced tariffs after that point. By the end of 2006, 1 million households were 
benefiting from this, although many more should be covered. 89 
 
Providing public finance means building a strong base of tax revenues to support the investment and 
subsidies. A recent UNDP report argues that developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, need to 
invest through the public sector in order to boost demand, improve productivity, and redistribute in favour of 
poorer households. To do this, governments need to borrow more of their own citizens‟ savings, and raise 
more taxes from those who can afford them: 
 
“A widespread „small government‟ ideology has masked the reality that many governments do not 
command the resources necessary to finance many essential public services. To put matters in 
perspective, for all developing countries, tax revenue as a ratio to GDP is only 18 per cent, compared 
to 38 per cent for industrial countries …. The case for boosting public revenue is particularly 
compelling in sub-Saharan Africa.” 90  
 
4.6. Transparency and governance 
Finally, the public sector needs reform. This can be based on the work done in India, especially by the Prayas 
group. 91 Prayas set out the achievements of the public sector system in India, acknowledged the problems 
including lack of transparency, but rejected the solution of privatisation as the worst option for transparency. 
Instead, they argued: 
 
“This leaves us no choice but to give centrality to the public-friendly transparency, accountability and 
participation (TAP) provisions in our efforts to reform and restructure the Indian power sector. This is 
necessary to permanently stem out the possibility of take-over of the sector by the unholy alliances. This, in 
turn, would require that all the governance functions and governance agencies are made amenable, on 
mandatory basis, to full transparency to the public, direct accountability to public, and meaningful 
participation of public.” 
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